Optimizing armies

The military often lies to itself and to civilian oversight (the President, Congress, the rest of us) about how well training of our own and allied troops is going and how ready they are for a fight. This has consequences.

From https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-26/why-america-cant-build-allied-armies

In Afghanistan and advisory missions across the globe, the United States relies on strategies to motivate its partners that do not work. The U.S. military prioritizes building relationships with foreign militaries over applying any sort of conditionality to its security assistance, and civilian officials in Washington defer to its approach. The United States then issues rosy reports to the American people about the progress being made by the local partner, which continue until the fateful day when the force is asked to operate on its own. And then Saigon. Mosul. And now Kabul.

...Why does the U.S. military persist with a strategy of advising that doesn't work? Like most large bureaucracies, it tends to institutionalize ways of doing business that serve its interests—in its case, autonomy, prestige, and access to resources. The military establishes standard operating procedures that advance its bureaucratic interests, and these SOPs tend to stick unless civilian leaders push hard for change.

Rapport-based persuasion may do little to incentivize local leaders to build better militaries, but it serves the U.S. military's bureaucratic interests. The gentle approach maintains comity with local partners and bolsters a narrative of cooperative partnership that legitimizes the entire advisory effort. In contrast, threatening local leaders with reductions or cessations of support could disrupt the U.S. military's own procedures and relationships. A more assertive approach to advising might also spark ugly conflagrations that call Washington's attention to the advisory effort, increasing the risk of civilian meddling.

If I were emperor of the U.S. military (so to speak), I suspect I could get more truthful readiness reports out of the military by using prediction markets to double-check official readiness reports? Let's say I allow soldiers currently in Afghanistan to invest up to $500 a year on either side of the proposition: "If the U.S. leaves Afghanistan within the next five years, the Taliban will take over at least 50% of the country." If the U.S. leaves Afghanistan during that time, and if the Taliban doesn't take over, anyone who invested in "No" gets $10 for every $1 they put in. If they do take over, anyone who invested in "No" gets $10 for every $1. If the U.S. doesn't leave the country during that time, everyone just gets their money back, with 8% interest.

If we had done this in Afghanistan, we would still have seen rosy official reports, but we would also have seen troops voting en masse with their wallets that the Afghan military would not and could not hold, and we might have been able to leverage that against both the military bureaucracy and the Afghan government: do whatever it takes to persuade the troops that you're ready to actually win a war, or you're fired.

Accurate feedback is a necessary first step on the road to optimization, and this might be one way to get accurate feedback.

-Max

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I could not love thee dear, so much,
Loved I not honor more.